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VIRGINIA'S DISdENSION 'l'OWARD
'fHE MEXICAN WAR
by

Angela Lilly

History Honors Thesis
Westhampton College
May, 1970

Pref ace
The Mexican War was not a nationally popular war.
Dissent came in various forms from opposition to extension
of slave territory through the annexation of Texas. to fear
of increased Executive power,

The majority of dissension

in Virginia came from the Whig party as the largest ant1Adm1n1stra tion

f~ction.

Thus, I tried to measure popular dissent by examining
the "mouthpiece" of this opposition party, the Richmond Daily
Whig.

In trying to narrow my topic, I chose for the limits
w~r

of my paper the period from Fall, 1845 to the

declaration

of Nay 11, 1846 and the repercussions immediately following
that declaration.

I felt that this gave an adequate expression

of the direct reaction and opposition to the
policy.

or

war

The vehemence of popular reaction was perhaps the

strongest at this point, with the
pages

~resident's

~higs

recording on the

their paper, every breath of this opposition to what

they considered an unjust and unnecessary war.

The Mexicans, through aggressive acts and unprecedented invasion of our soil, had crossed United States boundaries and the blood of Americans had been shed on American
soil.

'fhis announcement came in President

message to Cone;ress on 1'1ay 11, 1846.

~olk's

sµecial

He thus informed the

Congress that a state of war existed between Mexico and the
United Sates and emphasized the necessity of a formal war
declaration.

"As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our

efforts to avoid it, exists by act of Mexico herself, we
are called upon,· by every consideration of duty and patriotism, to vindicate, with decision, the honor, the rights
and the interests of our country •••• "1

In such a way, Polk,

presenting Congress with a demand for action, became the
first President to request a recognition of war rather.than
a wsir declaration from his Congressional branch. 2
'rhe facts precipitating the war proclamation and the
recognition of that

existln~

state of conflict were the

cause of much unrest within the country.

Although folk ha.d

stres ~,;ed the wrongs committed by the Mexican Government, the
Whigs, as the minority opposition party, raised strong doubts
as to the injustice that Polk himself was committing.

Their

lack of confidence in the Administrative decision broke
into loud vocal and written dissent, especially in the areas

2

of Whig strength in the Northeast.3

With such leaders as

John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster and John Davis, or Massachusetts, this area achieved primary importance ln the fight
for recognition of the majority party's wrongs against Congress and the public.

However, the South was not without

opposition to l'olk's war.

Such well known leaders as Jonn

C. Calhoun spoke violently against the acti1Jns or the Ad-

ministration. 4 Virginia>too, most vehemently expressed her
war opposition through a disGenting faction.

Assisted by

the printed word of the Richmond Dally Whig, as chief spokesman for the party, this faction and its newspap.er furnished
the major portion of opposition to the events preceding

the declaration of war and the war itself.
The minority party was able, with a great deal of
foresight, to take an apprehensive view of those events
preceding the actual war message.

In the r.1onths before

May 11, Polk had taken several steps, marked by Whig spokesmen as definite moves toward

1845, there was skepticism

ag~ression.

expres.~ied

As early as November,

as to the enectlve-

ness of Congress in its action toward .·,exico.

An article

th 1t appeared in the IUchmond Whig on November 10, ::;ta ted
that ttthe new Congress, which is to convene in riashington
on the first of December will probably undertake • • • as large
an assortment of wholesale mischief as has been undertaken
for many years past.

We anticipate vigorous attempts • • •

J
to bully and browbeat Mexico into surrender of sale of all
her integral territory on this side of the Rio del Norte
(Rio Grande) • • • • "5

This prediction showed the force with

which a Whig press attacked even primary action bJ the
President and Congress.

It also brought to signal 11aportance

the question of the Texas boundary.

Conflict over the river

valley led the way f'or United States involvement and the
subsequent declaration that announced the aggression of
Mexico.
In the fall and winter months of 1845, decisive action
by the President moved events

toward a peak.

In his speech

to the opening session of Congress in December, Polk informed the Legislative branch of his orders to

~eneral

Zachary

Taylor to move troops to a position "between the Nueces and
the del Norte(River).

. ..,,6

The troop movement came as a

result of petitions from the l'exas C·mgress to.ward off a
threatened invasion of her territory by Mexico.?

The Mexi-

cans had strong opcos1tion to the annexation of fexas to the
United States, which took place by formal decl8ratlon of
the United States Congress in December, 1845.
On November 10, 1845, John Slidell of Louisiana had
been sent as envoy to the Mexican Government, illustrating
Polk's renewed attempt to re-establish diplomatic relations
between Mexico and the U. S. and thus "improve" the state
of international affairs.

The mission was conducted in

4

the greatest secrecy.

However, when news of his visit reached

the press, Slidell's purpose was disclosed

~ts

dealing not

only with annexation of rexas(as most thought), but also the
boundary dispute between Mexico and l'e:x:as, a.nd the possible
purchase of California ani New Mexico.

rhe Mexican Govern-

ment, already 1n a tottering position, could not possibly
upset her precarious balance by receiving the American minister.

Had Slidell been received in

~'iexico

City by the

Herrera Government, the Mexican people would have even more
cause to question the regi:rie in power.

Later in May 1846,

the Richmond Whig delved into the dilemma that faced the
Mexican officials, stating "the minds of the people of
Mexico had been inflamed against the United States.

.

.

by

the aggressive acts of our Government • • • • (and) Herrera's
administration was overthrown, expressly on Lhe ground of
its willingness to negotiate with the

U~ited

States . •

With the overthrow of Herrera's Govermment in 1846, his
successor Paredes refused to recognize the credentials of
Mr.

~lldell,

and thus, our agent was unceremoniously sent

home.

When Slidell was refused acceptance in

~exlco

City,

President Polk ordered ·raylor and his troops to move from

Corpus Christi, to the left bank of the Rio Grande.
news of this move

re~ched

When

Richmond, the Whig expressed the

sentiments of many Virginians by printing "the news from

.. 8

5
Mexico ls important and proves that matters in that country
are by no means favorable to a quiet "ldjustment of existing
difficulties with the United States.

...9
If

However, before .

raylor's position had been established, the Whig forces
skeptically looked at this action, aware of the pos:;ibility

of a conflict.

ro quote their ·•tongue-in-cheek" observation,

the warhawks • • • are stirring their wings, and
preparing to fan up the sparks of war into a
combustible flare. It would seem a pity. • •
that so much pugnacious patriotism as has been
recently exhibited should be altogether wasted;
and just in ~he nick of time, Mexico with her
usual blundering awkwardness, steps ln and µresents a fair target for our concentrated wrath.

. . .10

With his cannon aimed at the Hexican village and his

camp at such a location as to

blockad~

the river, Taylor's

actions provoked cr.1es among a dissenting element that the
Mexican Government would term these troop movements as
age:,ressive.

As a statement of Virginia belief, t..he position

of the army was again questioned.

The published article posed

the query, "if it was expedient • . • to send our army to the
Hio Grande, why order them to pitch their tents directly
opposite Matamoras; with their cannon pointing into the town?
• • • this course looks very like a determination to provoke
war with Mexico.

1111

The questi n of the rexas boundary

w~s

of major con-

cern to the Whig faction in ascertaining the true origins of
the WRr spirit.

As pointed out, they basically felt that

6
Taylor's movement to the Rio Grande was an over extension
of U.

s.

power.

The Whigs looked to history for the basis

of their argument in that the boundary of l'ex,:ts, upon its
annexation to the United States, had been accepted as that

one established by the Texas Congressional statute of December 19, 1836.

It was this statute plus a treaty agreed to

by General Santa Anna, under duress,

t;~arlier

Lbat same year

that extended the boundary of Texas possibly to the Rio del
Norte(Rio Grande).1 2

The question posed by most Whigs, here

in Virginia and throughout, wus the actual valldlty of the
Rio Grande boundary claim.
war

mess·=.u~e

In commenting on the President's

published in the Rlchml)nd WhiSj, they state that

" the President's message assumes what

re:~lns

to be proved,

that the territory lying between the Nueces and the Rio del
Norte is 'American soil' • • • • nlJ
this boundary had but

anythi~g

To the anti-Polk Whigs,

been proven.

~he

validity

of a declaration by the Texas Revolutionary Convention held
little weight with the strict co11stitutionalism of the Whigs.
The apprehension they felt toward reliance on a shakey

d~c

laratlon of the Texas Congress, supported by che props of
American arms,

expres~'>ed

itself in a published statement

immediately following the war declaration.

"It is

m~nifest,

1f a mere declaration of the rexas Revolutionary Convention
is to settle arbitrarily

~nd

conclusively the question of

boundary, that • • • had (they) thought proper to embrace

7
within her paper limits the city of Mexico itself •• • we.

..

should be bound to maim that pretension good by force of
arms.

...
Yet the Whigs had stronger evidence for thelr dis-

pute with the AJminlstration.

In a report by the Committee

of foreign Relations for the House of Representatives. of

which Charles J. Ingersoll was Ch11rrnan. the Vlrginlfi! dissenters took

cour~ge.

r111s committee defined the boundary

--

between l'exas and Mexico as "between the Nueces and the

-----

Bravo rivers(stlll another name for the Rio ~rnnde) • • • • ~15
It seemed an extension of theory to the Whigs that, by putting

importance on this

Congres~ional

claim, the President should

have treated the territory as a disputed area.
move troops 1n to threaten the Mexicans, Polk
left the dispute to peaceful negotiation.

Rather than
sho~ld

have

Expressed in the

illustrious style of the period, the disputed claim came to
life in the rhetoric or the Whig."It would have been time
enough to have planted our flag on the Rio Grande and to
h~ve

h~d

cut the Gordian knot with the sword, when negotiation
failed to untie it ••

.

.

The Whigs. perhaps wlth proper perspective. saw that
side of the conflict viewed by the Mexicans.

Their writings

tried to show, through dissent toward the Administration,
the other side of the war "coin".

In articles published by

the Daily Whig, Hexican claims received prime importance as

8
the newspaper tried to justify its stand tow9.rd what the
Whigs considered Lhe aggressive P«llcy of the United States.
As shown in contemporary reports from the war scene(letters,
new spa per correspondence and even notes from General 'raylor) l 7,
the climate of opinion tended toward regarding the territory
as Mexican in nature, snd thus.claims by the Mexican government had equal validity to United
by choice of the people,

had more validity.18

~tates

claims.

In fact,

these prior Mexican claims perhaps

The Whigs felt t~at Texas laws had

never extended over that portion of disputed land(between
the Nueces and H1o Grande).

·rhe people still 11 ved there,

governed by .Mexican laws and Hexican officlals. 1 9

With con-.

d1tions such as these, how could there be any question in
the Mexican mind but that the

u. s.

government,

her executive, had invaded Mexican soil

~nd

by

order of

"findlng our

troops on the banks of the Rio Grande, which she claims as
a part of her soil, • . . attacked them • . . • (as they) had
first expelled the 'people ot' the soil' whom they found in
peaceful occupation of it on their arrlval • . • • " 20
Whig sentiment was not favorable to the formal declaration of war

~sked

for by the President ln the Spring of

1846.

'rhe dissenslon toward admlni strati ve policy appeared

qui~e

strongly in the debates in Congress following the war

message.

In addition to Polk's special address on May 11,

the House of Representatives' i'lilltary Affairs Committee

9

presented a bill on the floor of the H mse authorizing a
1

supply of men and money to be put at the President's disposal.

Hnd this been the

ex~ent

of the declaration, the

dissenting elements would not have reqcted quite so vlolentlp
ln their attempts at debate and in the press.

However,

Representative Brockenbough, a Florida democrat, administrative whip and "hawk", added a preamble to the provision
bill.

·rhe preambLJ..e gave formal recogn1 ti on to the actual

state of war by reading, ••whereas, by the act • • • of Nexico,
a

st~te

of war exists between that

States • . • • " 2 1

~overnment

and the United

Therefore, all affirmative votes seemed

to advocate involvement in a war caused by Mexico and her
violent act ion a,gains t the U. S.. in a:ldi ti on to providing
troops and

sup~l1es.

Since debate on the war bill was strictly limited to
two hours, Whig members were expressly forbidden the time
to read the major documents included with the war message.
Only two protesters had ultimate succeBs in being recognized
by the Speaker of the House.

rh·~·se

two demanded recogni tlon

in order to explain their r·'trnons for requesting an excuse
from voting. 22

One of t~ose recognized, Representative

Thomas H. Bayly from Virginia, expressed his resentment of
the preamble and in turn voiced the sentiment of a loss
vocal minority.

Bayly stated:

10
I ask to be excused from voting. I cannot vote
in silence without placing myself in a false
position. I co~slder the bill virtually a declaration of war • • • when we do not know that the
invasion of our territory and the eggressiJn
acts are s:lnctioned by the Mexican Government
. . . • I am unwilling, therefore, at this time,
and under the circumstances, to vote for a declaratlun of war • • . • 23
Still, the bill passed the House by a vote of 174 to 14
and went on the Senate debate.
'factics of speed and majority push -:ilso railroaded
the war bill hurriedly through the :Jenate Chamber.

Having

been so successful in the House, the democratic tacticians
allowed only one day for debate and managed, above the roar

of the minority opposition, to call for a vote on May 12th.
The pleas of the Whig senators for time to review the documents accompany in:; the President's mes:mge went unheeded.
Thus, by an even more overwhelmi1 .p; majority of 40 to 2,
the Senate officially confirmed the state of war already
announced by President Polk.? 4
The consequence of the war declaration was grave and
feelings expressed by those of the opµositlon faction were
strong.

'rhe thoughts of the Virginia Whigs in regard to the

war centered around two major questlons--the true southern
boundary of rexas and the relationship of Mexico's aggression
to it 2 5and, the actual constitutionality ofthe war.26
questions of the war's validity
two poles--one involving the

~ravtt~At(~d

pre~mble

These

towurd one of

to the wur provlsl0ns

11

bill, forced on the minority party with complete dlsreg:1rd
to conscience; the other rotating artmnd the axls of what
was cons1.dered the usurpation or Contrress1onal power by
the President.27
The Whig m1nor1ty judged the preamble as part of a
"master plan" to absolve the President of his responsibility
for the war.

Through the vote for the provisions blll, Con-

gress was forced to thrust what seemed to be majority support
behind the Administration's

w~r

policy.

The

m~jor

avenue

of dissent ttken by the Whigs still revolved around the

questlon of the rexas boundary and what they considered
aggress1 ve action by Polk toward

1.. iexlco.

Thus, they viewed

the Administration and not the Mexicans as committing the
first wrong.

In summary of the lr position toW!3,rd the pre-

amble, the Whig issued a statement that
the Administration regarded che vindication of its
own wrong conduct • • • as of far more consequence
than the defense of the country • • • • It is required that they(Congress) should acquit hr. Polk
of all censure ln adv~nce, by voting for a pre'::tmible asserting a fnct that did not exlstA • . •
that •war exists by act of Mexico• • • . ~~8
By such tactics, the majority party placed the dissenting
elements of the m1nori ty in a posl t ion of l-Jeighing patriotism

with politics.
The Senate debates on the
Whigs considered

q

w~r

bill furnished what the

prime example of how a majority party could

capitalize on public excitement in order to accomplish its

12
own policies .-29.

In apprehension of

powerful majority,

::i.

the Virginia Whig press spoke out against the Administration
stating that "the insidious efforts • . • to forestall the

public judgment • • • by the unqualified

assum~tion,

~hat,

in crossing the left banlc of the Hio Gr:,mde. the l"'iexicans
have 'invaded' our soil • • • • ", was a misrepresentation
of facts.JO

This confusion of facts opened the way for the

Whig condemnation orthe preamble that "by the act or the
Republic of Mexico, W9.r exists".
was not available as a proven

Since specific information

st~tement

of Mexican intent,

wgr under those clrcums t.~rnce s was "not only unwise, but
unjustifiable".3l
The oppressiveness of the Democratic party
a peak

lt1

the debate over the war bill.

approach~d

The Whigs felt that

the dominant party was attempting to equate love of country
with support of the Administration, and they believed that
the two were by no means synonymous.

·rhey saw the prea1nble

as the mani "b=-ula ting tool, g:rindlng them into the

~mrface

of

society with cries of "modlCied treason", as opposed to
patrlotism.32

The diversity between politics and patriotism

drove these men to raise their pleas toward the Presidential
Party~

They saw a dlstlnctlon between the patriotic supply

of troops and money to r•ro tee t the country• s frcntier, end
the political aspect of carrying out this protection with a
·1Jar declaration.

"It is in vain that the l\.drninistra ti ve

1)

party are implored, by the minority, to strike from the bill
this political feature • • • so as to enable them, with clear
consciences, to vote for the men and fuoney • . • • The defense
of the country, and the unanimity 1.n the measures necessary
for th·:>. t object, might be important; but the vindication of

the Administration and its investment with new and unprecedented powers was, in the estimation of the majority, still
more sot"33
The reference to the "new" powers of the Executive
provide an introduction to the prime question posed by the
voices of Whig dissent.

rhc chief opposition to the President

and his policy came not because of the actual existence of
war at all--th:it is, its origlns--but, from the method used
to declare the existence of a conflict.
on the war bill, Senator William

s.

In the Senate debate

Archer of Virginia em-

phasized the necessity of a Congressional declaration of war,
warning,"It has been stated on highest authority that the
President of the United States cannoc declare war.
vention of Congress is

~bsolutely

indispens~ble

The inter-

to consti-

tute wars • • • • there can be no wur until • . • the Congress
of the U. 3 • • • • authorize war . . . . . . J4

The Whigs did not deny that Mexico had given somewhat juGt cause for a war through past acts of ~ggress1on;35
but, the techn1cal1 tHrn of strict cons•:;ruc tionalism of the

Constitution appeared in their argwnent against the present

14
war. "If Congress had declared war • • • the justice of the
war as well as the const1 tutionuli ty, would ha -.,.e been cheerfully conceded by the united voice not only of our citizens,
but of the civilized world • • • • nJ6
war did not come from a

from the

a~gre~;sive

Yet, the origin of the

Congref~slonal

policy ordered

declaration.

It arose

the President and his

by

subsequent announcement of the "existing" conflict.

•ro

reiterate this position, Senator Archer, in reply to the
President• s message of !1a,y 11, declared " that the l-:iresident
does not affirm • • • a state of war.

cannot af'.'irm l t ; for

Hf~

if he did, he would affirm that which in a

and consti-

le~al

tutional acceptation, could not be true.

".37

Still, the Whig fact ion had to race ti:e f'ac t that the
special
of war.

mess~ge

of the President declared an

ex1sti1~

st~te

'rhus, their attack moved from the virtual ques-

tioning attitude presented by

~enacor

Archer, to an all out

aLtack on the usurpation of Congressional power
President.

by·

the

In vehement indignation, the Whigs proclaimed

the President's duplicity in his move toward detracting power
from Congress.

The strength of their feelings of fear to-

ward the Executive and his newly attained power appeared in
the Richmond Dally \'lh1g scarcely less that three weeks after
the proclamation of May 11th.

The Whigs aaw the "usurpation

of the war-;..1ower by that branch of' the

~overnment,

w1th which

all the infractions of the Constitution since its adoption,

1.5
put together, are not to be compared in mugnitude or in
danger.

. . .n38

They believed this increase of Presidential

power a serious threat to the continuing effectiveness of
the constitution.

Thus~

the protest against the war was the

result, not of an avid humanitarian zeal for the defense of
Mexico, but a strong desire for defense of the Constitution.
What the Whigs termed usurpation of Congressional power by
the executive branch instilled fear into their hearts, provoking loud <r1es !lgainst the

w~-jr.

'fhey saw

the usurpation itself a dangerous enlargement of
Executive authority beyond the limits prescribed
for it by the Constitution, and a.s tending still
farther to strengthen the monarchial br~nch of
our Pederat1ve system, the powers of which have
alarmingly increased, are still increasing, and
ought to be, nay must be diminished, or che whole
theory of our ~overnment ls revolutionized, and
the checks -.nd limitations of the Constitution
are weaker than ropes of aanct.39
The Whigs felt that the President hid no more right
to pursue a policy

~hat

to declare war himself.

~ould

lead inevitably co war, than

In their view, President

~olk

had

committed both of the.se wrongs and thus, by his policy must
take the responsibility for a wnr declaration.

It was this

power that was expressly withheld from him by the Constitution.
Therefore, through the strong grounds of' constitutional
structuralism, the Whigs based their claim that the war,

"1!!

its or1i:z:1n,(was) both unconstitutional and unnecessary.
However, since the W3r had been declared by act of

Congress and the Whigs did not wish to

co~mlt

political

...

sulclde,41 their dissension toward the origins of the conf Lict
were rechann~led into support of the war effort.
their press, "We are in favor of an

ener~etic

To quote

prosecution

of the w~r, without reference to its origin or to its necessity;
now that is has commenced • • . • u42

They no longer felt that

the carrying on of war involved unjust acts.

However, they

did feel forced, by what t:1ey considered unnecessary suprort
of the Administration,

to vote the men and sup1lies needed

for the speedy termination of the war effort.

Whig voices

defended their position of seemingly confllcti11g ideology

by saying, "'l'he duty of every citizen ls to oppose such acts
of his own Government a3 in his oplnio•j are wrong in themselves; but nevertheless, if they result in war, to support
it by all the means in his power, in its vigorous and successful prosecution.

•

. .u43

With similar patriotic zeal, the Whig faction produced

a warning note to their fellow countrymen.
viewpoint

th~t

the

w~r

They held the

was not a just one, but a war of

aggression on the part of'' the President.
tendency extended not only

tow~rd

This agLressive

the Mexlcan-U. S. border

conflict, but also included the Executive •s unwarranted moves
against the powers of Congress.
support for their position,

In a glowing attempt to rally

the Virginia

~higs

declared,

"we shall not hesitate, • . • to stimulate our countrymen to
uphold the honor of our flag, at the same time to warn them

17
not to be misled, by their patriot impulses, into even a tacit
defense o f an ac t o f th e

Q

~xecu

ti ve . . . • u44

'rhe harsh war

action of the President, condemned over and over by the Whigs,
held prominence as the direct origin of the war and
the Administration

war involvement.

alon~

should be held answerable for the

This warni:1g ln.l·egard to

tried to guard the public

t~hus,

ag~inst

a1:1~resslve

action

what the Whigs considered

the Administration's attempt to gain popular support through
erroneous information. 4 5
The great fear the Whigs possessed dealt with the
threat of American arms committing the United States to
military involvement and thus, to achieving our "manifest
destiny" by force of weapons.

In a logical prediction weeks

before the war declaration, the Richmond Whig published the
following fearful statement,

The army of Texas ls on the advance. • • we may soon
hear of a new triumph of American arm~;. But, in
such a cause, and with such a foe, even victory
loses half its charm. Hitherto our sword has never
been unsheathed, save in defence of our own territory. Now it is to be drawn, for the first time,
in a war of aggression--never perhaps to be returned
to its scabbard until our 'manifest destiny• has
arrived at its complete fulfillment, in the dominion
of the United ~gates over the whole of North
America. • • •
·
They believed that through proper negotiation, the boundary
question could have been solved and thus, the existence of
war prevented.
from ;·Jhat

The strong apprehension they held generated

they felt would continue froru a boundary dispute

'18

to a wa.r of t1conguest -:md annex::i.t !.on, which in the end may
be far more disastrous than even defeat itself.

. . .1147

This projected disaster found solid root in the Whig fear
that such a conti'.1ued and prolonged conflict wouilld e.ive the
Fresident increased power--a force the Whigs feared desperately
for him to control.48

Thus the Whigs reaction toward the wqr was one of a
violent nature on paper and in debate.
fear--not only of aggressive U. S.

It ··eneret ted from

pattern~,

but from the

overextension of Constitutional powers by the President.
They felt their position threatened by the Executive's
apparent attempt to dissolve those powers inrrained in the
system of constitut.ional government.
The declaration of the Mexican War furnished a prime

example of the failure ofthe minority to

f~nction

as a

brel:lklng force on what had been termed the tyranny ofthe

~ajo:rity. 4 9

'rhe opposition that the Whig t'actJ.,m expressed

in V1rB1n1a gravitated from indignation at the initiation

of hostile action to condemnati ·n of the ability of an
Administration that would allow the citizens of the country
to be placed in a perilous position.

l'he President had taken

1t upon himself to endanger the lives 01· American citizens
without a sanctlon from Congress--thqt body expressly siven
the

~ower

to determine armed conflict.

The Whigs felt that

19
they were joined in their opposition to Presidential policy
by a majoirty of the population who realized the ineptitude

of the Administration.
A primary example of written dissent towo.rd the

W'.lr

appeared in a concise form several days after the war proclamat1on.

The Richmond Dally Whig emphasized the moral lesson

of the conflict in

re~ard

to

·~1hat

could be taught future

generations from the grave mistakes made in 1o46:
Is there not a lesson to be taught. at t~is epoch,
to those who may here after be disposed to involve
their coun.ry in unholy wars. by the risk of Mr.
Polk and his advisers have run, in bringing about
the present crisis? The people, too, themselves,
may see the folly of elevating weak men to the
exercise of power which should be entrusted alone
to the patriot. the statesman and the philanthropist.
How can the present rulers in Wa~hlngton rest
their heads upon a downy pillow and hope to seek
repose. whilst the reflections of their own minds
must couae them to exclaim, 'Oh Lord, we acknowled;;i;e our transgressions--we indeed have sinnedt'
What rivers of blood have been shedt--what wretchedness and misery h~ve already been brought upon
the country, by the imprudent acts of an reckless
ruler! Do not countless widows and orphans. made
wretched by the f'ate of those most dear to them,
cry aloud for retributive justice to be heaped upon
the heads of those who have inflicted the blows?
How can it be possible that the authors of such
misery in others caDnot be also authors of wretchedness in themselves?~O
The war represented a source of misery and discontent
for all involved.

The Whigs, with their opposition to the

policy of war. tried to zutde the people toward
in a framework of voiced and written discontent.

re~ction

Yet, in

their form of reaction. the Virginia Uhigs felt compelled

with-
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to support the United States involvement in this unjust and
unnecessary conflict.

I'hus, along w1 th strong questioning

of Administrative actlon, they hoped for a speedy end to
a war that should never have begun.
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